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COMMENTS
THE PROBLEM OF INVOLUNTARY
RETIREMENT BEFORE AGE 65
"I am afraid that, in trying to assist those affected by the
very real problem of age discrimination, we have pried open
a can of legal worms. "*
Today a large number of older Americans, denied employ-
ment opportunities or involuntarily removed from their jobs,
are entering the courts to challenge the legality of the employ-
ment decisions which placed them among the unemployed.
The challenges are based on claims of age bias in employment
practices.
There are many forms of age discrimination in employment.
Some of these discriminatory practices are prohibited under
state or federal law.1 Others are excepted from these laws, an
apparent concession to the cmployers' claims of commercial
necessity.2 Another form of age discrimination-the involun-
tary retirement of older employees before they reach age sixty-
five-is to some legal minds a permissible employment prac-
tice, and to others, an invidious denial of protected rights. The
problem of discrimination against older workers3 and the ap-
* S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967) (Individual Views of Senator
Dominick).
1. There are at least 32 states as well as the federal government which currently
have operative age discrimination laws or regulations. Kovarsky & Kovarsky,
Economic, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Age Discrimination Laws in
Employment, 27 VAND. L. REV. 839, 915-25 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Kovarsky &
Kovarsky]. Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia also prohibit age discrimination
in employment.
The various fair employment practice laws of the states are compiled at [1976] 8
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) Fair Empl. Prac. Man. § 451.
2. For a general cataloging of reasons why employers do not hire or promote older
workers, see Kovarsky & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 845; Note, Age Discrimination in
Employment: Correcting a Constitutionally Infirm Legislative Judgment, 47 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1311, 1315 (1974); Fine, Older Workers in Pursuit of New Careers, in TowARD
AN INDUSTRIAL GERONTOLOGY 39, 41-43 (H. Sheppard ed. 1970); Slavick & Wolfbein, The
Evolving Work-Life Pattern, in HANDBOOK OF SocIAL GERONTOLOGY 298, 308 (C. Tibbits
ed. 1960).
3. For purposes of this article, an older worker is defined as an individual at least
forty years of age but less than 65 years of age. This is the age group which is included
within the protection of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 et seq. (1970).
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plicability of federal age discrimination laws is the subject of
this article.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Age discrimination in employment affects thousands of
American workers.4 It is a problem of ever-increasing magni-
tude in a country where the average age of the population
moves continually upward,5 a trend which is expected to con-
tinue for the next several decades.' At present, thirty-seven
million people in the United States are between forty and sixty-
five years of age, approximately forty-four percent of the
eighty-four million over sixteen years of age.' By 1990, it is
estimated that forty-seven million Americans will be between
forty and sixty-five years old.'
Currently more than eleven million employees are members
of retirement plans which require retirement before age sixty-
five, and several million are members of plans which permit
involuntary retirement before that age.' The question of
4. See H. R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) (message of President
Johnson) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; Legal Problems Affecting Older Amer-
icans: Hearings Before the Special Senate Comm. on Aging, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1970); U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964; RESEARCH MATERIALS
67-69 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESEARCH MATERIALS]; Note, Age Discrimination in
Employment: The Problem of the Older Worker, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 384-88 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Older Worker]; Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REv. 380 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Age Discrimination].
5. The trend toward an older America is best illustrated by an examination of the
median age of the population. In 1800, the median age of the white population was
16. By 1970, the median age of the United States population had risen above 28 years.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (94th ed.
1973).
6. M. BARRON, THE AGING AMERICAN 32 (1961); SPENGLER, AGING POPULATIONS: ME-
CHANICS, HISTORICAL EMERGENCE, IMPACT, IN EMPLOYMENT, INCOME, AND RETIREMENT
PROBLEMS OF THE AGED 35 (J. Kreps ed. 1963); Schulz, The Economic Impact of an
Aging Population, 13 THE GERONTOLOGIST 111-12 (1973).
7. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, AGE DISCRIMINA-
TION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967 1 (1972).
8. Kovarsky & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 840.
9. 69 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 41 (April 1973); See also Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment: Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings]. One study found that of 21 million workers
covered by private pension plans in 1971, 7 million (34%) were subject to compulsory
retirement, 3.5 million (17%) were subject to automatic retirement, and 1.5 million
(7%) to a combination of the two. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS DIVISION, U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967 - A REPORT COVERING Ac'rv-
TIES UNDER THE ACT DURING 1973 28-29 (1974).
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whether a retirement or pension plan may lawfully require re-
tirement before age sixty-five is of basic importance to the
administration and enforcement of the federal and state age
bias laws.
The problem of involuntary retirement plans is one of com-
paratively recent origin. Prior to the enactment of the Railway
Labor Act" and the growth of labor unions, the terms and
conditions of employment were usually fixed for each employee
on an individual basis." As union membership increased,
collective bargaining supplanted the individual negotiation of
employment terms. The passage of the Wagner Act" in 1935
further stimulated union growth, and collective bargaining pre-
vailed in most industries in interstate commerce. The Wagner
Act required both employers and labor representatives to bar-
gain in good faith over wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment. 3 The good faith bargaining requirement brought
employees a number of concessions from their employers. For
example, employers relinquished considerable authority in the
areas of hiring, promotion, and retention of employees and also
agreed to provide a number of benefits to qualified employees. 4
As a result of this realignment in the respective bargaining
positions of the parties, many union contracts with employers
provided for retirement benefits. Prior to the enactment of the
various state and federal age discrimination laws, employers'
retirement practices were often challenged under the Taft-
Hartley Act." Pension and retirement benefits were recognized
as an issue directly related to wages and hours of employment"
and a mandatory subject for collective bargaining. However,
when the contract was silent, employers were said to have uni-
lateral control over the retirement decision as long as they
acted in a reasonable and nondiscriminatory fashion. 8 Absent
10. Ch. 347,44 Stat. 577 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18,28 and 45 U.S.C.).
11. Kovarsky & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 868.
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1970).
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159 (a) (1970).
14. Kovarsky & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 868.
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, et seq. (1970).
16. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied 336 U.S.
960 (1949); Hughes v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 26 L.R.R.M. 2317 (W.D. Okla. 1950);
Flowers v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen, 212 Ga. 142, 91 S.E.2d 41 (1956); Lamon v.
Ga. S. & Fla. Ry., 212 Ga. 63, 90 S.E.2d 658 (1955).
17. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
18. Cashner v. United States Steel Corp., 327 F.2d 533 (6th Cir. 1964); United
1977]
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a showing of an illegal motive violating the Railway Labor Act
or Taft-Hartley Act, unions and management were free to set
virtually any retirement age and impose any condition on re-
tirement benefits by contractual agreement.'9 The age discrim-
ination laws curtailed this negotiation freedom.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
A. State Age Laws
In 1903, Colorado became the first state to enact a prohibi-
tion of age discrimination."0 The law simply banned the dis-
charge of an individual between the ages of eighteen and sixty
years where the discharge was based "solely and only upon the
ground of age."'2 Similar laws were enacted by Louisiana in
1934 and Massachusetts in 1937.22
These early laws were essentially criminal statutes and were
sporadically enforced. 2 Today, following the lead of Massachu-
setts in 1950, most jurisdictions that prohibit age discrimina-
tion24 have delegated enforcement responsibility to administra-
tive agencies. 25 This is the approach taken by Wisconsin, where
the responsibility for administering the state's Fair Employ-
ment Act,2 16 which includes a prohibition against age discrimi-
nation, is statutorily delegated to the Department of Industry,
Labor and Human Relations.27
States Steel Corp. v. Nichols, 229 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1956) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 950
(1956).
19. Kovarsky & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 868-69.
20. [19761 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) Fair Empl. Prac. Man. § 451 at 182.
21. COLO. REv. STAT. § 80-11-16 (1963).
22. [1976] 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) Fair Empl. Prac. Man. § 451 at 491, 569.
23. Kovarsky & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 876.
24. The jurisdictions which have operative bans on age discrimination are, in order
of year of enactment: Colorado (1903); Louisiana (1934); Massachusetts (1937 & 1950);
Rhode Island (1956); Pennsylvania (1956); New York (1958); Connecticut (1959); Wis-
consin (1959); Oregon (1959); Puerto Rico (1959); Alaska (1960); Delaware (1960);
California (1961); Ohio (1961); Washington (1961); Montana (1961); New Jersey
(1962); Nebraska (1963); Hawaii (1964); Maryland (1964); Idaho (1965); Indiana
(1965); Maine (1965); Michigan (1965); Nevada (1965); New Hampshire (1965); New
Mexico (1965); North Dakota (1965); Kentucky (1966); Illinois (1967); West Virginia
(1967); Georgia (1971); District of Columbia (1973); Iowa (1974).
Source: [1976] 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) Fair Empl. Prac. Man. § 451; Note, Older
Worker, supra note 4, at 388.
25. [1976] 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) Fair Empl. Prac. Man. § 451; see generally
MATsUMOTO, STATE LEGISLATION ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1961).
26. Wis. STAT. §§ 111.31-111.37 (1975).
27. Wis. STAT. § 111.33 (1975). The Wisconsin Act also provides for judicial review




Sixty-four years after the first state regulation of age dis-
crimination, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967.28 This Act represents the first compre-
hensive federal legislation aimed at protecting older workers
from arbitrary employment decisions based solely upon age. 9
The present ADEA is an outgrowth of a study undertaken
by the Secretary of Labor in 1965 pursuant to a congressional
mandate contained in section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.11 In fashioning the federal bill, Congress drew heavily
upon the laws and the years of experience of the states. In
deference to this experience and in consideration of the limited
resources of the Department of Labor,32 the federal legislation
contains a saving clause that provides that "any State perform-
ing like functions" may continue to handle age discrimination
complaints unless an action has been commenced under the
ADEA.33 However, no action is permitted under the federal act
"before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been
commenced under State law, unless such proceedings have
been earlier terminated . . . . 3 These provisions effectively
promote federal-state comity and eliminate many complex
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ADEA].
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970). Prior to enactment of the ADEA, congressional
activity in this area was primarily directed at helping the older worker cope with
technological innovation and environmental changes. E.g., Manpower Development
and Training Act of 1962, Pun. L. No. 87-415, 76 Stat. 23; Older Americans Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3001 et seq. (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). See 113 CONG. Rc. 34745 (1967)
(remarks of Rep. Gilberg); id. at 34752 (remarks of Rep. Dwyer); Age Discrimination
in Employment: Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills Before the Gen. Subcomm. on
Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 355, 461
(1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 House Hearings].
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1970); see U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, REPORT To THE CONGRESS
ON AGE DISCRIAINATION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIvIL R rsn ACT OF
1964 (1965) [hereinafter cited as SaCRrARY'S REPORT]; RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra
note 4; Note, Age Discrimination, supra note 4, at 383.
31. See S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT]; Kovarsky & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 876.
32. The Secretary of Labor has been charged with the responsibility of administer-
ing the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 624-626 (1970).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1970) provides that state action is superseded where an
action is brought under the ADEA. See Note, State Deferral of Complaints Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 492 (1976); Note, Age
Discrimination in Employment: Available Federal Relief, 2 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB.
281 (1975); Note, Procedural Aspects of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 36 U. Prrr. L. REv. 914, 916-21, 923-27 (1975).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1970).
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ment of the ADEA.341
The substantive provisions of the ADEA are similar to those
of many of the state age laws. The Act protects workers be-
tween the ages of forty and sixty-five35 from a variety of dis-
criminatory practices in most employment-related situations.3 6
The stated purpose of the Act is "to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age" and to
"prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment. ' 37 In
pursuit of these goals, the ADEA contains broad prohibitions
against refusals to hire, discharges and discriminatory treat-
ment of workers because of age,38 as well as retaliatory action
against those asserting their rights under the Act.39 The ADEA
also bans age discrimination in employment advertisement,"
employment agency referral practices" and labor union activi-
ties. 2
The language of these prohibitions is deceptive unless read
in conjunction with the four broad exceptions to the Act. The
first two exceptions permit an employer to make employment
decisions "based on reasonable factors other than age"4 or "for
good cause."" These sections, which are standard provisions in
most antidiscrimination legislation, 5 logically preserve the
34.1. See, e.g., Walker Mfg. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 27 Wis. 2d 669, 135 N.W.2d
307 (1965).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1970). This is the age group which is most frequently protected
under the age laws. Wisconsin and thirteen other states specifically limit the applica-
bility of their laws to those in the 40 to 65 age category. Wis. STAT. § 111.32 (1975);
[1976] 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) Fair Empl. Prac. Man. § 451.
The age 65 ceiling has been criticized on constitutional grounds. Note, Age Discrim-
ination in Employment, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 924, 945 (1975), [hereinafter cited as Age
Discrimination in Employment]; Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Correct-
ing a Constitutionally Infirm Legislative Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1311 (1974).
Alaska, Iowa, Maine, Nevada and New Hampshire do not specify any protected age
group.
36. The ADEA applies to the following: all employers "engaged in an industry
affecting commerce," who have twenty or more employees; to states and local govern-
ments; to the federal government; to employment agencies; and to labor organizations.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 630(b), (c), (d), and 633(a) (1970).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970).
38. Id. at § 623(a)(1).
39. Id. at § 623(d).
40. Id. at § 623(e).
41. Id. at § 623(b).
42. Id. at § 623(c).
43. Id. at § 623(f)(1).
44. Id. at § 623(f)(3).
45. It is interesting to note that the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act contains no
1058 [Vol. 60:1053
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employer's right to make management decisions affecting older
workers on the basis of merit instead of ageI6 and are consistent
with the stated purposes of the Act.4"
The last two exceptions are of an entirely different charac-
ter and, in effect, serve to excuse discriminatory actions based
on the age of the individual." An employer is allowed to make
decisions based on age "where age is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
the particular business."49 Although most state age discrimina-
tion acts include similar exceptions," as does Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act with respect to all traits but race,5' there are
yet no clear standards for determining what constitutes a
"bona fide occupational qualification" sufficient to excuse a
discriminatory act or practice.5
2
The second exception which serves to excuse discriminatory
action permits an employer, employment agency, or labor or-
ganization "to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system
or any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement,
pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade
the purposes of . . . [the] Act, except that no such employee
benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any such individ-
ual." 52 .1 This inartful accumulation of words has generated a
wave of protracted litigation and has eviscerated the substan-
specific exception for decisions based on "good cause" in its prohibition of age bias.
See Wis. STAT. § 111.32 (1975).
46. See Age Discrimination in Employment, supra note 35, at 946.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970).
48. See Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 1975); Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment, supra note 35, at 946.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970).
50. See Kovarsky & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 915-925; [1976] 8 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) Fair Empl. Prac. Man. § 451.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970). See Miller, Sex Discrimin[ation and Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REv. 877, 883-90 (1967); Developments in the
Law - Employment Discrimination and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
HAnv. L. REv. 1109, 1176 (1971).
52. See, e.g., Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976);
Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974); Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 950 (1971);
Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Houghton v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 413 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Mo. 1976). Although several standards have
been enunciated in the above-cited decisions, none of them has met with any substan-
tial critical approval. Note, Age Discrimination, supra note 4, at 400, 408-10; Age
Discrimination in Employment, supra note 35, at 947.
52.1. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970).
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tial protection against arbitrary employment termination
which the otherwise clear language of the statute affords the
older worker.
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE INVOLUNTARY RETIREMENT
QUESTION
A. Experience Under the State Laws
A majority of the states which have age discrimination acts
include a provision making otherwise prohibited practices law-
ful when related to an acceptable pension, retirement, or bene-
fit plan.13 As in the federal Act, the states generally require that
in order to qualify for the retirement policy exception, the dis-
criminatory action be taken pursuant to a "bona fide plan"54
or a plan which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the
legislation.5
The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act,5" which was enacted
prior to the ADEA, provides that its prohibition against age
discrimination 57 is not to be construed "to affect any retirement
policy or system of any employer where such policy or system
is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of . . . [the Act] . ' ' 8
The retirement policy exception was construed by the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court in Walker Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial
Commission,59 the leading case on the issue of an employer's
53. See [1976] 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) Fair Empl. Prac. Man. § 451.
54. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420.1 (West, 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-126
(1973); HAW. Rav. STAT. § 378-9 (1968); N.J. REv. STAT. § 10:5-2.1 (1976); 43 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 955 (1976).
55. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. § 111.32(5) (1975); DEL. CODE tit. 19, § 711 (1975); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 17.458(3a) (1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48.1003 (1974); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
296(3-a)(c) (McKinney, 1972).
56. Wis. STAT. 99 111.31 et seq. (1975). Originally enacted in 1945 Wis. Laws, ch.
490, the Act was later amended to include the present prohibitions on age discrimina-
tion, 1959 Wis. Laws ch. 149.
57. Section 111.32(5)(b) of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act provides:
(b) It is discrimination because of age:
1. For an employer . . . because an individual is between the ages
of 40 and 65, to refuse to hire, employ, admit, or license, or to bar or to
terminate from employment such individual, or to discriminate against
such individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions or
privileges of employment . ...
The Act also prohibits age discrimination in job advertising, job application forms, and
inquiries in connection with prospective employment, Wis. STAT. § 111.32(5)(b)2
(1975); as well as retaliatory action against those asserting their rights under the Act.
Wis. STAT. § 111.32(5)(b)3 (1975).
58. Wis. STAT. § 111.32(5)(c) (1975).
59. 27 Wis. 2d 669, 135 N.W.2d 307 (1965).
[Vol. 60:1053
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right to involuntarily retire employees protected under state
age laws.
In Walker the employer implemented a policy of systemati-
cally retiring all employees over sixty years of age with ten or
more years of service at the company. Thirty-eight employees
were retired pursuant to a "pension agreement" which pro-
vided that any employee who attained age sixty and had ten
years of service was subject to retirement by any one of three
methods: at his own option, at the employer's option, or under
mutually satisfactory conditions. If the employee was retired
either at the employer's option or under mutually satisfactory
conditions, the plan afforded the employee increased benefits
until either age sixty-five or eligibility for primary social secu-
rity nefits, whichever occurred first. Thereafter benefits contin-
ued at the same rate as that of the voluntary retiree. 0
In considering whether the challenged retirement policy
was a subterfuge to evade the purpose of the Act,6' the court
looked to the legislatively-declared policy of the State - "to
make unlawful conduct which '... tends to deprive the vic-
tims of the earnings which are necessary to maintain a just and
decen standard of living, thereby committing grave injury to
them.' "62 The court then concluded that there could be no
finding of subterfuge unless it was established "that the re-
tirement benefits payable to the retired employee were unsub-
stantial, or, if substantial, that continued payment thereof was
likely to be jeopardized."6 Because the plaintiff did not con-
tend that the funding requirements of the plan were inade-
quate to provide the retirement benefitg specified, the court
looked to the average amount received by the thirty-eight em-
ployees until age sixty-five and decided that the Walker Com-
pany plan was not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the
Act.64
The court's holding in Walker was contrary to that of the
Wisconsin Industrial Commission,"' which found the Walker
60. Id. at 673, 135 N:W.2d at 310.
61. Initially the court stated:
[Tihere is no essential difference between an age-discrimination statute pro-
viso phrased in terms of retirement policies or systems that are not a subterfuge
. . . and the corresponding provisions of age-discrimination statutes which
speak in terms of "bona fide" retirement or pension plans.
Id. at 683, 135 N.W.2d at 315. (Emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 685, 135 N.W.2d at 316 citing Wis. STAT. § 111.363.
63. 27 Wis. 2d at 685, 135 N.W.2d at 316.
64. Id. at 686, 135 N.W.2d at 316-17.
65. The Industrial Commission was renamed the Department of Industry, Labor
19771
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Company policy to be a subterfuge. The Commission based its
conclusion on the fact that the plan did not mandate retire-
ment of workers before age sixty-five, but permitted the com-
pany to do so at its option. The court considered the inclusion
of the option feature to be immaterial, as long as it was not
itself a subterfuge: "the test is not whether the exercise of the
option is a subterfuge but rather whether the option provision
of the pension agreement is such that to permit its exercise
would constitute a subterfuge."6 Thus, the court directed its
attention to an evaluation of the plan as a whole. This ap-
proach is consistent with the language of the statutory excep-
tion, which allows employers to act pursuant to a retirement
plan that is not in conflict with the purposes of the Act. 7 Thus,
an employer need only insure that its retirement plan complies
with the requirements of the statute. Thereafter, the employer
may freely operate the plan without laboring under the appre-
hension that each employee retired thereunder might success-
fully challenge the exercise of the option provision in that par-
ticular instance.
In Walker the Industrial Commission also based its finding
of a subterfuge on the fact that the Walker Company did not
attempt to ascertain the physical health or occupational quali-
fications of the employees before retiring them. But the court
held that a failure to ascertain the qualifications of the employ-
ees is immaterial to the issue of subterfuge when the retire-
ments are made pursuant to the option provisions of a pension
agreement. The court relied on the existence of a statutory
exception for the discharge of a worker "physically or otherwise
unable to perform his duties."" Reasoning that the retirement
policy exception would be surplusage if its application were
limited to terminations solely for health reasons, the court con-
cluded that the legislature did not intend to restrict the retire-
ment policy exception to situations in which the employee is
physically unable to perform the job duties. 9
In determining the question of the substantiality of the ben-
and Human Relations in the Executive Branch Reorganization Act, 1967 Wis. Laws
ch. 75.
66. 27 Wis. 2d at 684, 135 N.W.2d at 316.
67. Wis. STAT. § 111.32(5)(c) (1975).
68. Id.
69. 27 Wis. 2d at 685, 135 N.W.2d at 316.
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efits and hence the subterfuge issue itself, the supreme court
considered the total amounts to be received by the retirees
until age sixty-five. The court's approach is consistent with
state policy. Since it is the individual's ability to maintain a
"just and decent standard of living" which the Fair Employ-
ment Act seeks to protect, 70 the court properly considered not
only the actual pension benefits, but also vacation pay, social
security benefits and unemployment compensation received,
as well as insurance premiums paid by the employer. However,
state policy should also require that the entire amount of bene-
fits received by the retirees be considered in determining the
substantiality question, not just those benefits payable until
age sixty-five.
It is true that the Act only protects individuals until they
reach sixty-five. However, the state's concern for the welfare of
its citizens does not terminate upon their reaching sixty-five.
In view of the meager amount of social security benefits re-
ceived by most retired workers," it is inconsistent with the
policy of the Act to allow an employer to involuntarily retire
employees under a plan which would only provide benefits
until age sixty-five, and which thereafter would leave the re-
tiree with only social security income for the remainder of his
years. It should be borne in mind that the amount of the
monthly social security benefits received are reduced when one
elects to commence receiving benefits prior to age sixty-five."
Although many states have had age discrimination laws in
effect for a number of years, there have been few reported deci-
sions arising under the state acts. Even fewer state decisions
have considered the validity of involuntry retirement of older
workers before age sixty-five.
One case which did is Delvitto v. Shope,73 a class action
70. Wis. STAT. § 111.31(1) (1975).
71. In Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Correcting a Constitutionally
Infirm Legislative Judgment, supra note 2, at 1319, it is pointed out that the average
amount of benefits received by retired workers in recent years is below the poverty
income level established by the government.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1970). Although the court in Walker based its decision on
the amount the retirees received until age 65, it did note that the reduction in social
security benefits was offset by pension benefits payable beyond that age which the
court said were not required under the Wisconsin Act. 27 Wis. 2d at 686, 135 N.W.2d
at 316.
73. 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 436, 333 A.2d 204 (1975).
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brought under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.74 In
Delvitto the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the implementation of
a retirement system which provided for the payment of benefits
upon involuntary retirement at age sixty-five. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court quickly disposed of the plaintiffs' claim
that mandatory retirement violated civil rights protected by
both the Pennsylvania75 and United States Constitutions.76 The
court relied on its earlier decision in McIlvanie v. Pennsylvania
State Police,7 wherein similar claims by the plaintiff were re-
jected because no showing was made that the state's retirement
system was arbitrary or unrelated to bona fide occupational
factors. 78
The plaintiffs also contended that the operation of the re-
tirement system violated rights protected by the ban on age
discrimination contained in the Human Relations Act.79 Be-
cause the Pennsylvania Act recognizes an exception where
employment is terminated "because of the terms or conditions
of any bona fide retirement or pension plan,""° the court denied
the plaintiffs relief. The court concluded that "a plan, such as
the one involved here, which establishes an involuntary retire-
ment at age sixty-five and provides for receipt of retirement
benefits at that age, falls within this statutory exception. 81
The opinion did not attempt to define what constituted a
bona fide retirement or pension plan within the meaning of the
statute. Interestingly, no mention was made of the fact that the
statutory protection against age discrimination is limited to
individuals between the ages of forty and sixty-two, thus plac-
ing the plaintiffs outside the coverage of the Act."
Another state involuntary retirement case is Thompson v.
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951 et seq. (Purdon 1964) (Supp. 1974-75).
75. The plaintiffs relied on PENN. CON sT. art. I, § 26 (1968), which provides, in
pertinent part: "Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivisions thereof
shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any
person in the exercise of any civil right."
76. It was broadly claimed that the mandatory retirement system violated rights
protected by the fourteenth amendment.
77. 6 Pa. Commw. Ct. 505, 296 A.2d 630 (1972), aff'd 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801
(1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 986 (1974).
78. 6 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 513, 296 A.2d at 634.
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 995(a) (Purdon 1964) (Supp. 1974-75).
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 955(a)(i) (Purdon 1964) (Supp. 1974-75).
81. 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 439, 333 A.2d at 205.
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 954(h) (Purdon 1964) (Supp. 1974-75).
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Chrysler Corp.,83 (Thompson I). In this action, brought under
the Michigan State Fair Employment Practices Act 84 and sub-
sequently removed to federal court, the plaintiff, Annie
Thompson, challenged the validity of her involuntary retire-
ment at age fifty-five. Chrysler retired her pursuant to a plan
which allowed the employer to involuntarily retire employees
over fifty-five years of age with ten or more years of service,
when the employee suffered from a disabling health condi-
tion. 5 The forced retirement was based on the worker's alleged
disability due to heart disease and arthritis. However, the
plaintiff contended that in her case the early retirement provi-
sion was used as a subterfuge to discriminate against women,
blacks and older persons.
In considering the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment on the age discrimination claim, the court considered the
statutory prohibition of age discrimination against individuals
between the ages of eighteen and sixty,8 as well as the Act's
retirement plan exception, which provides, in pertinent part,
that nothing in the Act shall be construed "to affect the retire-
ment policy or system of an employer where that policy or
system is not merely a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this
section unless that policy or system, if established on or after
July 1, 1965, provides for a mandatory retirement age of less
than 65."11 Chrysler's retirement policy was established prior
to the July 1, 1965 cutoff date provided in the statute.
In opposition to the defendant's motion, the plaintiff
argued that, since she was neither disabled, nor was her work
performance poor, the company did not comply with the terms
of the plan. The court brushed aside the plaintiff's contentions,
finding no triable issue of fact, and decided the case on a tor-
tured construction of the age discrimination statute. Acknowl-
edging that every mandatory retirement discriminates against
the older worker, the court observed that the statute allows
such a result when it is bargained for between an employer and
83. 382 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
84. MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.301-423.311 (1975).
85. The plan also provided that before the company could effect an early retire-
ment, the employee's disability must result in excessive absenteeism, decreased pro-
duction, and frequent application for and receipt of sickness and accident payments.
382 F. Supp. at 1320.
86. MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 423.303a(a) (1975).
87. MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 423.303a(e) (1975).
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the employees' representatives. The Michigan Act indeed re-
quires that for mandatory retirement to fall within the statu-
tory exception, it must be carried out pursuant to a plan which
is not a subterfuge for discrimination. However, in a piece of
legal legerdemain, the court simply announced an irrebuttable
presumption that plans initiated before July 1, 1965, are not
subterfuges for discrimination,"8 although no basis can be
found in the statute for recognizing such a presumption.89
To justify its ipse dixit the court stated that:
The Court cannot second guess the state legislature. It re-
quired only that Chrysler act pursuant to the terms of the
agreement; this the defendant has done. Whether that action
was properly taken is a contract issue among the plaintiff, her
union and Chrysler. Otherwise, the Court would be forced to
review every case in which an employer retires an individual
pursuant to a pension plan since it is conceded that by its
nature such an action befalls only those who are of matured
age.90
In reaching its holding, the court effectively read out of the
Michigan Act the only protection afforded older workers
against arbitrary discharge under any retirement plan adopted
before July 1, 1965, even if the plan is clearly a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of the age discrimination laws. Regrettably,
Thompson I still stands as precedent for determining the rights
of an involuntarily retired older worker under the Michigan
Act. Even more regrettably, the bulk of the decisions under the
ADEA more closely resemble Thompson I and Delvitto, than
the thoughtful, judicious approach taken by the Wisconsin
court in Walker.
B. The Treatment of the "Bona Fide Plan" Exception in the
Federal Courts
A considerably greater number of cases wherein an involun-
tarily retired worker challenges his forced superannuation
under a retirement plan have arisen under the ADEA than
under the state acts. Thus far, the trend in the federal courts
88. 382 F. Supp. at 1320.
89. See MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 423.303a(e) (1975). It should be noted that the
July 1, 1965, cutoff date provides that retirement policies or systems established after
that date do not come within the statutory exception if they provide for a mandatory
retirement age of less than sixty-five.
90. 382 F. Supp. at 1321.
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has been to uphold involuntary retirement practices. However,
a significant minority viewpoint would considerably restrict
the employer's ability to force retirement. These two differing
viewpoints are best represented by the recent decisions of
Zinger v. Blanchette9 and McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc.9"
Zinger is the most recent and the most cogent decision in a
line of cases under the ADEA which uphold, for various rea-
sons, the involuntary retirement of older workers prior to age
sixty-five. The Zinger holding and its rationale are best under-
stood when viewed from an historical perspective, best arrived
at through an examination of the problems which have plagued
the courts in deciding involuntary retirement cases under the
ADEA.
The first in this line of federal cases is Grossfield v.
Saunders.9 3 In that case the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defen-
dant from involuntarily retiring him at age sixty-four pursuant
to an existing pension plan. The court denied the plaintiff relief
on both procedural94 and substantive grounds. As a substantive
basis for its decision, the court stated that, in retiring the plain-
tiff, the employer did no more than observe the terms of a
retirement plan which in its opinion was not a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of the Act. 5 The court made no attempt to
define what constituted a "subterfuge" within the meaning of
the statute, nor was the plan or any of its provisions analyzed.
Grossfield was followed two years later by Stringfellow v.
Monsanto Co.,96 an action brought by a group of employees
between the ages of forty and sixty-five who were involuntarily
retired after plant shutdowns necessitated a reduction in the
employer's work force. The reductions were not based on sen-
iority, but rather on the results of an evaluation of the ability
and job performance of each employee. The court upheld the
employer's decision on the ground that both the employee eval-
91. 549 F.2d 901 (3rd Cir. 1977).
92. 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976).
93. 1 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), No. 68 Civ.
4923.
94. The plaintiff had failed to properly notify the Secretary of Labor of his intent
to file an action under the ADEA, a condition precedent to bringing a suit under the
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970).
95. 1 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. at 625; Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 623(8)(2)
(1970).
96. 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
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uation program and the subsequent work force reduction were
based on reasonable factors other than age and thus were not
within the prohibitions of the Act." The court also stated that
involuntary retirement was not prohibited by the ADEA where
the company observes the terms of a "bona fide Employee
Retirement Benefit Plan which . . . did not constitute a sub-
terfuge to evade the purposes" of the Act. But the court failed
to examine the plan itself or explain why the plan was bona fide
and not a subterfuge.
Finally, in 1971 in the decision in Hodgson v. American
Hardware Mutual Co.,9 the purpose and scope of the bona fide
retirement plan exception were analyzed. In Hodgson the dis-
trict court held that an employer could not mandatorily retire
a sixty-two year old employee who did not participate in the
company retirement benefit plan, even though the Act allowed
the employer to retire participating employees at that age. ' In
addition, the court intimated that one of the congressional pur-
poses behind the exception allowing employers to observe oth-
erwise proper retirement or benefit plans was to encourage the
hiring of older workers by allowing an employer to refuse to
permit an employee over the maximum entry age of the plan
to enroll in it. In the words of the court, "A requirement that
newly hired older workers be entitled to the same retirement
benefit provisions as younger ones would make the cost of fund-
ing such retirement plans prohibitive and discourage employ-
ers from adopting them."'' ° The legislative history of the ADEA
clearly supports the court's interpretation of the purpose be-
hind the bona fide retirement plan exception. 02 Hodgson is the
first decision to consider the statutory exception as anything
other than a mere justification for mandatory early retirement.
It also represents the first opinion in which the language of the
provision was evaluated in light of the stated purposes of the
Act.' 0
97. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970) allows differentiation between older employees
where based on reasonable factors other than age.
98. 320 F. Supp. at 1181.
99. 329 F. Supp. 225 (D. Minn. 1971).
100. This view is in accord with that expressed in the interpretative bulletin of the
Department of Labor, 29 C.F.R. § 860.110 (1975).
101. 329 F. Supp. at 229.
102. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4 and 14 (Individual Views of Senator
Javits); HousE REPoRT, supra note 4, at 4.
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970).
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The ADEA retirement plan exception was considered for
the first time by a federal court of appeals in the 1974 case of
deLoraine v. MEBA Pension Trust."4 deLoraine voluntarily
retired in 1964 under a pension plan which required a forfeiture
of his pension rights if he returned to employment in the mari-
time industry."5 During the Vietnam war, the plaintiff and
other retirees were granted permission to return to their former
occupations. In 1970, after the increased demand for marine
engineers subsided, permission to work was withdrawn by the
trustees and plaintiff, fearing a loss of benefits under the plan,
retired once again. After unsuccessfully pursuing state reme-
dies, 18 the employee commenced an action in federal court,
charging that the withdrawal of permission to work in 1970 was
motivated by a desire to replace older engineers with younger
ones. The lower court granted the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to
set forth sufficient evidence of a discriminatory policy.07
The circuit court affirmed the finding that the plaintiff vol-
untarily retired and that the pension trust, which was created
long before the passage of the Act, paid substantial benefits to
a broad class of workers. Based on these facts, the court con-
cluded that "the Trust is certainly not itself a subterfuge to
evade purposes of the statute.' '08
A similar result was arrived at by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co.,' 01 an action
brought by the Secretary of Labor on behalf of a worker who
had been compelled to retire at age sixty pursuant to a profit
sharing retirement plan and was then refused reemployment
when he applied after his termination. The Secretary con-
tended that the plan was not bona fide within the meaning of
the statute because its compulsory retirement feature had not
been adequately communicated to the participating employee.
104. 499 F.2d 49 (2nd Cir. 1974).
105. Mr. deLoraine had retired in 1964 after 20 years of service as a marine engi-
neer. 499 F.2d at 49.
106. Plaintiff's charge of age discrimination under New York law was dismissed on
the merits by the State Division of Human Rights in May 1971. The State Human
Rights Appeal Board affirmed in December 1971, both on the merits and on jurisdic-
tional grounds.
107. deLoraine v. MEBA Trust, 355 F. Supp. 89, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
108. 499 F.2d at 50.
109. 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
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The appeals court summarily rejected this contention, stating
that the plan "was effectuated far in advance of the enactment
of the law, eliminating any notion that it was adopted as a
subterfuge for evasion."" 0 The court failed to consider the fact
that the Act prohibits plans which are subterfuges to evade the
purposes of the ADEA, not merely those which seek to avoid
compliance with the Act itself."'
The legislative history of the ADEA clearly indicates that
plans existing prior to the Act do not automatically satisfy the
exception. 1 2 However, the Taft majority declined to examine
the Act's legislative history, choosing instead to rely on "the
straightforward language of the statute" and the "practical
difficulty of deciding, on a case by case basis, whether a given
course of conduct is within the Congressional purpose." ' 3
In Taft, the court also rejected the Secretary's claim that
the employer violated the Act by refusing to hire the retired
employee. The Secretary relied on the provision of the Act
which states that "[no employee benefit plan] shall excuse the
failure to hire any individual.""' However, in the court's opin-
ion, the Secretary's interpretation would render the retirement
plan meaningless, a result which Congress could not have in-
tended.
The dissent challenged the majority's conclusion that the
plan was bona fide since the employee was merely provided
with a summary of its provisions that contained only a brief
reference to a "normal retirement date" after age sixty. The
dissent contended that the statutory exception "would not jus-
tify the company to deprive an employee of rights otherwise
accorded him under the Act unless the so-called plan expressly
provided for compulsory termination at age sixty.""'
The dissent also questioned the scope of the retirement plan
exception:
110. 500 F.2d at 215.
111. See Dunlop v. Haw. Tel. Co., 415 F. Supp. 330, 331 (D. Haw. 1976) in which
the Taft rationale was rejected. See also Age Discrimination in Employment, supra
note 35, at 950.
112. "It is important to note that [the 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)] exception applies to
new and existing employee benefit plans . . . ." HousE REPORT, supra note 4 at 4;
SENATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4.
113. 500 F.2d at 217.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970).
115. 500 F.2d at 218 (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
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The language of the statute creating an exception, if, in fact,
it really does create an exception, is not artfully worded. It
says only that 'it shall not be unlawful for an employer...
to observe the terms of a bona fide. . employee benefit plan
such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not
a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter . .. ' In
addition to the fact that rules of construction require that this
language, as an exception to the general provision of the Act,
is subject to the narrow construction rule, the language itself
falls short of saying "it shall not be unlawful for an employer
to 'enforce' or "carry out' the terms, etc.""'
Although the Taft dissent has received some recent reconsider-
ation,"17 the Taft majority opinion and its automatic exemption
of plans which antedate the passage of the Act are largely dis-
credited today."" Today, Taft merely serves as an illustration
of the problems which the courts have had in interpreting and
applying the "subterfuge" clause of the Act.
A chronological analysis, similar to that of the Taft case,
appears in Steiner v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs."' Former umpire Steiner challenged his forced retire-
ment under a plan requiring all league umpires to retire on the
January 1st following attainment of age fifty-five, unless the
league commissioner consented to postretirement date serv-
ice. 2 The retirement plan, which had been the subject of
collective bargaining between the National League and the
umpires' association, provided for the payment of a fixed in-
come to the retiree upon termination of service. The plaintiff
agreed to continue as an umpire for an additional season after
his normal retirement date. After completion of the additional
season, the plaintiff received poor performance ratings in an
evaluation conducted by the League and the League decided
116. Id. at 220 [emphasis in original]. Judge Tuttle also noted the requirement
that a party relying on an exception establish that it plainly and unmistakably falls
within the "terms and spirit of the legislation." Id. See Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324
U.S. 490 (1945).
117. McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217, 219-20 (4th Cir. 1976).
118. See text accompanying notes 127, 131, infra; Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment, supra note 35, at 950; Dunlop v. Haw. Tel. Co., 415 F. Supp. 330, 331-32 (D.
Haw. 1976).
119. 377 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
120. Since the plan was adopted in 1956, ten umpires had reached retirement age,
and in each case the League had requested, and the individual umpires had agreed,
that retirement be deferred forlsome period of time. 377 F. Supp. at 947.
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not to request further deferral of his retirement.
The plaintiffs claim rested on two arguments: (1) that the
retirement provision of the plan constituted a subterfuge to
avoid the purposes of the ADEA, and (2) that he was discrimi-
nated against because other umpires were retained in service
to a later age. The court rejected both contentions. The court
summarily rejected the claim of subterfuge noting, as did the
Taft court, that the plan was implemented before age discrimi-
nation was prohibited, and therefore, "could not have been
evolved in an attempt to circumvent any public policy or
law."' 2' The court also rejected the umpire's claim that the
discretionary postretirement service feature was discrimina-
tory. The court relied on the Secretary of Labor's published
interpretation that such provisions do render invalid an other-
wise bona fide plan.12 1
In 1976, Annie Thompson again challenged her discharge
from the Chrysler Corporation. This time her action was based
on the provisions of the ADEA. The case of Thompson v.
Chrysler Corp., 23 (Thompson II) involved the same parties, the
same district court, and even the same chief judge presiding as
Thompson L Predictably, in Thompson II, the court also
reached the same result.
In granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
the court relied on its earlier conclusion that the plaintiff was
retired for health reasons pursuant to a bona fide retirement
plan which had not been established as a subterfuge to evade
the purpose of the law. Despite the employer's claim that the
employee was terminated for health reasons, 24 and contrary to
the plaintiffs allegation of good health, the court found no
triable issues of fact as to the existence of a disability. The
court refused to look beyond the face of the defendant's
''special early" retirement plan and to consider the effect of the
plan on the objectives of the ADEA. Instead, the court was "not
persuaded that even a narrow construction of the excepted
employment practices in 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) compels the result
121. 357 F. Supp. at 948.
122. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.110 (1976). However, the Secretary has apparently
changed his position on this question. See McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d
at 219-20.
123. 406 F. Supp. 1216 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
124. As noted earlier, the retirement plan in this case provided for early retirement
only upon the existence of certain health related conditions. See note 55 supra.
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which the plaintiff seeks.' 1 5 Thus the court concluded that the
plaintiff was retired for health reasons without receiving any
evidence of the actual condition of her health. Furthermore, it
concluded that the retirement was made pursuant to a bona
fide plan, without evaluating the provision of the plan. Appar-
ently, the court relied on the presumption it had manufactured
in its earlier decision in Thompson I.
A more thoughtful approach to the early retirement prob-
lem was taken by the court in Dunlop v. Hawaiian Telephone
Co.' 5 Although the eight individuals who were involuntarily
retired prior to age sixty-five were denied recovery under the
Act, the court adopted a sensible definition of the "subterfuge"
provision of the statutory exception. The Dunlop court rejected
the Taft approach of "automatically grandfathering" all pre-
ADEA plans into the bona fide plan exclusion of section 4(f) (2)
of the Act.' 27 The court noted that a plain reading of
"subterfuge" in the statute would appear to render the excep-
tion meaningless, and then developed a workable construction,
interpreting "'subterfuge' as denying . . [an employer] the
protection of § 4(f)(2) only if the . . .[employer] uses a retire-
ment plan as a subterfuge to retire an employee without the
payment of substantial benefits." 12 Since in the court's opinion
the defendant's plan provided sufficient benefits upon retire-
ment, the court concluded that the company's involuntary re-
tirement of the eight employees prior to age sixty-five was done
pursuant to a bona fide retirement plan and that the com-
pany's actions were thus exempt from the proscriptions of the
ADEA.129
Hawaiian Telephone was followed by Zinger v. Blanch-
ette. 29 .' In Zinger, the plaintiff was inevoluntarily retired
several months before his sixty-fifth birthday. Upon his retire-
ment he was entitled to receive pension benefits from several
sources. However, due to his early retirement he received fewer
benefits than he would have had he worked until age sixty-five.
125. 406 F. Supp. at 1217.
126. 415 F. Supp. 330 (D. Haw. 1976).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970).
128. 415 F. Supp. at 331. This analysis compares favorably with the approach
taken by the Wisconsin court in Walker Mfg. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 27 Wis. 2d 669,
685, 135 N.W.2d 307, 314 (1965).
129. 415 F. Supp. at 333.
129.1. 549 F.2d 901 (3rd Cir. 1977).
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Zinger sued claiming that he was discriminated against under
the early retirement plan which, although bona fide, was a
"subterfuge."'30
The defendant, Penn Central Transportation Company,
relying on Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., contended that
since the retirement plan predated the ADEA, it could not be
considered a subterfuge. After examining the legislative his-
tory 3' and noting that the statute speaks of evading the
"purposes" of the Act and not the Act itself, the court rejected
the defendant's chronological argument and the Taft rationale.
The court also considered the broad question of whether the
ADEA proscribes all involuntary retirements before age sixty-
five. In view of the conflicting results in the McMann and Taft
cases, the court conducted an extensive examination of the
legislative background of the ADEA.
The court distinguished between outright discharge and
retirement, noting that "[w]hile discharge without compensa-
tion is obviously undesirable, retirement on an adequate pen-
sion is generally regarded with favor."'3 2 The legislative history
of the Act supported the conclusion that "while cognizant of
the disruptive effect retirement may have on individuals, Con-
gress continued to regard retirement plans favorably and chose
therefore to legislate only with respect to discharge.' '33
In both McMann and Taft, the Secretary of Labor urged the
courts to adopt the Labor Department's current position that:
[R]etirements [before 65] are unlawful unless the man-
datory retirement provision: (1) is contained in a bona fide
130. Plaintiff had also contended that he was protected from early retirement by
an agreement made by his former employer, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
prior to its merger with the New York Central Railroad. See, Pennsylvania Railroad
Company-Merger-New York Central Railroad Company, 327 I.C.C. 475, 544-45. This
contention was rejected by the court, finding that even if he was covered under the
agreement, plaintiff was not thereby exempted from involuntary early retirement. 549
F.2d at 904-05.
131. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4; SENATE REPORT, supra note 31, at
4.
132. 549 F.2d at 905. See generally, HEARINGS ON EARLY RETIREMENT AND RELATED
SUBJECTS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON RETIREMENT AND THE INDIVIDUAL OF THE SENATE
SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1967); Mandatory Retirement: The
Law, the Courts, and the Broader Social Context, 11 WILLAMETTE L.J. 398 (1975).
133. 549 F.2d at 905. See 133 Cong. Rec. 1089-90 (Message of President Johnson);
HEARINGS ON S. 830 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR
AND PUBuC WELFARE, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 27-28, 43, 53, 251, 304, 306 (1967); HEARINGS
ON H.R. 4221 BEFORE THE GENERAL SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON LABOR
AND PUBIC WELFARE, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1967).
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pension or retirement plan, (2) is required by the terms of the
plan and is not optional, and (3) is essential to the plan's
economic survival or to some other legitimate purpose - i.e.,
is not in the plan for the sole urpose [sic] of moving out older
workers, which purpose has not been made unlawful by the
ADEA. 34
The Zinger court rejected the Secretary's interpretation, noting
that the Department's current stance ignored the "obvious and
important distinction" between discharge without pay and re-
tirement on a pension, which were implicitly recognized in pre-
vious Department bulletins. Moreover, the Secretary's subse-
quent position is entitled to lesser weight because it is in con-
flict with his predecessor's interpretation, which was made con-
temporaneously with the consideration and passage of the
Act. 35
Recognizing that there are many cogent and persuasive ar-
guments against involuntary retirement before age sixty-five,
even with an adequate pension,3 6 the court chose to base its
decision solely on statutory interpretation:
An exemption's merits are properly matters of legislative con-
cern and evaluation. Congress has chosen to exclude retire-
ments pursuant to bona fide retirement plans so long as the
plan is not a subterfuge. That choice is binding upon us.
134. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, JANuARY 1975 REPORT PERTAINING TO ACTIVITIES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967 17 (1975);
McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976). Brief for the Secretary
of Labor, United States Department of Labor as Amicus Curiae, at 8-9; Brennan v.
Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1974).
135. See General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), wherein the Court was
confronted with an analogous situation and stated:
The EEOC guideline in question does not fare well under these standards.
It is not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII, since it was first promul-
gated eight years after the enactment of that Title. More importantly, the 1972
guideline flatly contradicts the position which the agency had enunciated at an
earlier date, closer to the enactment of the governing statute.
We have declined to follow administrative guidelines in the past where they
conflicted with earlier pronouncements of the agency. [citations omitted]. In
short, while we do not wholly discount the weight to be given the 1972 guideline,
it does not receive high marks when judged by the standards enunciated in
Skidmore [v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)]. 429 U.S. at 142-43.
136. See, e.g., Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory
Requirements and Recent Developments, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 227 (1974); Note, Age Dis-
crimination in Employment: Correcting a Constitutionally Infirm Legislative
Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1311 (1974).
1977]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
We leave to congressional consideration the broad policy
questions underlying the desirability of regulating the mini-
mum age for compensated involuntary retirement.
37
Thus the court concluded that "involuntary retirement pur-
suant to a bona fide plan that is not a subterfuge but which
requires or permits retirement at age 60 at the option of the
employer is not unlawful.' 138
McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc. 138-, stands in opposition
to the foregoing line of cases. This was an action brought by a
worker involuntarily retired pursuant to an employee pension
plan. The plan provided for a normal retirement age of sixty,
with continued service permitted at the employer's request. 139
Participation in the program was voluntary at the option of the
employee. 140 The plan under consideration had been imple-
mented prior to the effective date of the ADEA.'4 ' Based on this
fact, and relying on the Taft rationale, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
On appeal the circuit court reversed. The court rejected the
chronological argument advanced in the Taft case as
''unconvincing because what is forbidden is not a subterfuge to
evade the Act, but a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the
Act.' 2 In view of the stated purposes of the ADEA,13 the court
concluded that a plan must not be a subterfuge to evade the
137. 549 F.2d at 909.
138. Id. at 910. Based on its holding in Zinger, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reached a similar conclusion in Rogers v. Exxon Research and Engineering Co., 550
F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977), filed the same day as the decision in Zinger.
138.1. 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976).
139. In view of the fact that the employer's policy had been to retire all employees
at the normal retirement age under the plan, and had never retained employees beyond
that date, the court regarded the plan as requiring retirement at age sixty for purposes
of its decision. 542 F.2d at 219. Cf., Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212,
200 (1974) (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
140. The court attached no significance to the voluntary participation feature of
the plan. "Realistically, an employee's decision whether or not to forego lucrative
benefits, funded in part by employer contributions he would not otherwise receive, is
not 'voluntary' in the sense we think it would have to be in order to find a waiver of
statutory protection." 542 F.2d at 219 n.1.
141. The effective date of the Act was June 12, 1968. Pub. L. No. 90-202 § 15, 81
Stat. 602, 1967.
142. 542 F.2d at 220 (emphasis in original).
143. It is . . . the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimi-
nation in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment.
29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970).
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Act's prohibition of arbitrary age discrimination. "Stated oth-
erwise, there must be some reason other than age for a plan,
or a provision of a plan, which discriminates between employ-
ees of different ages."' 44
In support of this conclusion, the court noted that any other
reading of the "subterfuge clause" would produce an absurd
result: an employer could discharge a worker pursuant to a
retirement plan solely on the basis of age, but could not refuse
to rehire the presumptively otherwise-qualified individual
since the statute provides that the existence of such a plan
shall not excuse the failure to hire any individual.'45 Citing
Hodgson v. American Hardware Mutual Ins. Co.,'48 the court
noted that "conceptually there is no difference between a man-
datory retirement age of sixty-two and a refusal to hire anyone
who is sixty-two years old."'47
The court noted that in providing for the retirement plan
exception, Congress addressed the problem of the older worker
seeking employment at a later age and that Congress did not
intend to validate retirement plans which discriminate on the
basis of age. The court asserted that "the statute as drafted
does permit an employer to discharge employees 'to observe the
terms of' a plan. However, as we have already observed, in
order to escape condemnation as a 'subterfuge,' an early retire-
ment provision must have some economic or business purpose
other than arbitrary age discrimination.'1 8 Although the
McMann court did reach what would be considered by many
to be a laudatory result, its rationale is weak. The judicially-
imposed requirement that there be some basis other than age
for the operation of a permissible retirement plan ignores the
basic nature and structure of such programs. Invariably these
plans operate on the basis of the age of the employee, or on a
formula which uses a combination of age and years of service.'49
In fact, the Act specifically excepts from the prohibition
against age bias, differential treatment based on reasonable
144. 542 F.2d at 220.
145. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970).
146. 329 F. Supp 225 (D. Minn. 1971).
147. 542 F.2d at 221, citing 329 F. Supp. at 229.
148. 542 F.2d at 221.




factors other than age. 50 If there must always be some reasona-
ble factor other than age before an individual may be retired
under a pension or benefit plan, then the bona fide retirement
plan exclusion in the statute serves no purpose since such con-
duct is permitted under section 4(f)(1) of the Act.' 5'
IV. DIsCUSSION
The preceding review of the various involuntary retirement
cases illustrate the problems confronting the courts in attempt-
ing to resolve disputes arising under the age laws. This diffi-
culty is understandable and perhaps inevitable in any piece of
legislation which bans discharge for reasons of age, yet para-
doxically at the same time excepts from its prohibitions an
employer's actions in "observing" a bona fide retirement or
benefit plan which is not a "subterfuge" to evade the purposes
of the legislation. The task before the courts is to seek a solu-
tion which protects the older worker while allowing continued
observance of plans which are not inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the laws.
In American industry today, pension and retirement plans
are almost invariably part of the employee's compensation.' 52
This fact must be kept in mind in any legal analysis of the
forced retirement issue. Many of these plans, voluntarily estab-
lished and mutually accepted by both labor and management,
provide for permissible involuntary retirement of employees
prior to age sixty-five.'5 3 However, a significant number of
workers find themselves subject to premature retirement under
systems unilaterally established by the employer.' 4 In such
instances, there is a greater risk of discriminatory superannua-
tion of older workers.'5 5 Placed in this perspective, it is clear
150. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970).
151. Id. This section also permits otherwise discriminatory action where age is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the operation of the busi-
ness.
152. A recent survey discloses that settlements regarding pension and retirement
benefits are included in ninety percent of the collective bargaining agreements between
labor representatives and management. See BNA PENSION & OTHER RETIREMENT
BENEFITS, PPF Survey No. 103, Oct. 1973, at 1.
153. See Korvarsky & Korvarsky, supra note 1, at 907-11.
154. See 113 Cong. Rec. 31256-57 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Young); 1967 Senate
Hearings, supra note 9, at 22.
155. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (message of President Johnson); LEGAL
PROBLEMS AFFECTING OLDER AMERICANS: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SPECIAL SENATE COMM.
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that a workable solution to the problems of the older worker,
especially a solution to the problem of involuntary retirement,
must give due consideration to the realities of the industrial
setting and the retirement programs established through the
joint efforts of labor and management.
In evaluating the validity of an early retirement under such
a plan, one commentary' 8 suggests that the courts consider the
following factors: "(1) whether the plans are unilaterally estab-
lished by employers or with unions; (2) the compulsory age of
retirement; (3) the circumstances under which retirement can
be postponed; (4) whether retirement is voluntary or compul-
sory; and (5) the benefits paid."'5
Another commentator' 8 has urged that the courts take a
more restrictive approach when evaluating a benefit plan
which employs age restrictions. It is suggested that a court
consider whether age restrictions are intended to evade the
purposes of the ADEA and whether they are in fact unrelated
to the economic viability of the plan itself.'59 If either inquiry
can be answered affirmatively, the writer would have the court
strike down the retirement benefit plan as being in conflict
with the ADEA.'10
Of these two proferred analyses, the first is the more prac-
ticable. The second approach reads into the bona fide plan
exception a requirement not intended by Congress but drawn
from an admittedly ambiguous fragment of the Act's legislative
history.'"' The five-factor analysis'12 of the first approach pro-
ON AGING, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 19 (1970); RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra, note 4, at 67-69;
Older Worker, supra note 4, at 384-88; Note, Age Discrimination, supra note 4, at 380.
156. Kovarsky & Kovarsky, supra note 1.
157. Id. at 908.
158. Note, Age Discrimination in Employment, supra note 35.
159. This latter consideration of the relation to the fiscal viability of the plan,
roughly related to one of the stated considerations in McMann v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 542 F.2d at 221, is apparently derived from a statement made by the Secretary
of Labor that the § 4(f)(2) exception was "intended to protect retirement plans."
HEARINGS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT BEFORE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1967). It is
acknowledged that the nature and purpose of this intended protection is ambiguous.
Note, Age Discrimination in Employment, supra note 35, at 950 n.141.
160. Note, Age Discrimination in Employment, supra note 35, at 950-51.
161. See supra note 159. See also 29 U.S.C. § 624 (1970). This provision of the Act
directs the Secretary of Labor to make a study of the involuntary retirement problem,
indicating the Congress' uncertainty as to how it should in fact be handled. Cf., HousE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 5; SENATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4.
162. Kovarsky & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 907-08.
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vides the court with relevant indicia of whether a retirement
plan should be considered bona fide.' 3 However, albeit ger-
mane, the first analysis may lack sufficient judicially manage-
able standards to make it a useful analytical tool.
The Walker and Hawaiian Telephone decisions may pro-
vide the most satisfactory of the proposed solutions to this
problem. In both cases, the courts looked to the substantiality
of the benefits received by the retirees in order to determine
whether the observance of the retirement plans was a subter-
fuge to evade the purposes of the legislation. Certainly, the
primary consideration in evaluating a retirement policy or sys-
tem should be the quality of the benefits.it provides for retirees
since it is the welfare of the older individual which is the moti-
vating concern of any age discrimination legislation.
When the validity of a retirement system is challenged, this
writer advocates an approach which focuses primarily on the
substantiality of the post retirement benefits received. How-
ever, a number of other factors should be added into the court's
analysis to prevent injustice to the older worker. A plan unilat-
erally established by an employer should be more strictly scru-
tinized than one which is the product of collective bargaining
between labor and management. Additionally, the court
should consider whether participation in the plan is mandatory
or optional on the part of the worker. The age at which retire-
ment occurs must also be considered. A plan with an early
retirement date should provide more substantial benefits than
one having a later date if it is to be excepted from the Act's
prohibitions. Consideration of whether the age of retirement
under the plan flexibly accommodates the individual prefer-
ences of the employee or whether retirement may be postponed
are also relevant to a determination of the plan's validity.
The critical determinant of the validity of a retirement sys-
tem should be the amount of benefits provided. If the retiree
is able to maintain a standard of living reasonably similar to
that enjoyed during preretirement years, there seems to be no
reason for disallowing the employer's action in retiring the indi-
vidual. Certainly, if insuring the welfare of the older American
is the primary goal of age discrimination legislation, there
should be no conflict with the laws as long as the retiree is able
163. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970).
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to maintain a just and adequate standard of living during re-
tirement.
Admittedly, this analysis does not emphasize the preserva-
tion of the individual's right to work, a truly legitimate con-
cern. However, an early retirement involves a tradeoff: in ex-
change for the surrender of this right, the worker is given addi-
tional retirement benefits which he would not otherwise re-
ceive. Furthermore, the age discrimination laws protect the
retiree from discriminatory hiring practices should he decide to
seek a new job.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Whether an involuntary retirement decision is challenged
under the ADEA or applicable state law, the courts must avoid
losing sight of the purposes of the legislation in order to protect
the older worker from unjust treatment merely because he is
no longer a desirable commercial commodity. The federal and
state legislatures have unmistakably declared that our country
must reward those who have spent a lifetime shaping our na-
tional destiny. Whether the work was performed as a corporate
president or a bookkeeper, a supreme court justice or street-
sweeper, the older American is entitled to the benefits and
protection of such legislative enactments as Medicare, Social
Security and the age discrimination laws.
Nevertheless, the economic realities of American industry
must also be accommodated. In some occupations, mandatory
retirement programs are a commercial necessity. Employers
must be able to predict their future labor needs. Mandatory
retirement programs facilitate personnel planning decisions
and add an element of stability to the problem of work force
turnover. If the welfare of the older worker is insured, there
seems to be no logical reason for invalidating an equitable re-
tirement program.
The extensive legislative history of the ADEA is replete
with contradictory references and confusing statements. A
skillful advocate can find legislative history for virtually any
reasonably coherent interpretation of the purpose and plan of
the legislation. Many of the state age discrimination acts are
as inartfully drafted as the ADEA. Both the courts and the
older workers are now suffering the impact of this legislative
indiscretion. Many of these problems, however, need not exist
if the welfare of the older worker remains the predominant
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consideration in the construction and application of the age
discrimination laws. Certainly, an employer should be allowed
to observe any retirement program which provides substantial
benefits and enables the retiree to maintain a just and ade-
quate standard of living. Such an exemplary program should
be considered to be "bona fide" and not a "subterfuge" for
evading the purposes of the age discrimination laws.
PATRICK R. GRIFFIN
